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Abstract Abstract
This paper summarises some previously published work on imitation, experimentation (or
innovation) and aspiration thresholds using the FEARLUS modelling system and reports new
work with FEARLUS extending these studies. Results are discussed in the context of existing
literature on imitation and innovation in related contexts. A form of imitation in which land
uses are selected on the criterion of their recent performance within the neighbourhood of the
land parcel concerned (called here 'Best-mean Imitation'), outperforms comparably simple
forms of imitation in a wide range of FEARLUS Environments. However, the choice of criterion
is shown to interact with both the way the criterion is applied, and the land manager's
aspiration threshold: the level of return with which they are satisfied. The implications of work
with FEARLUS for the broader bodies of research discussed, and vice versa, are considered.
Imitation, Innovation, Aspiration, Land-Use, Spatio-Temporal Heterogeneity
 Introduction  Introduction
To say a decision-maker "imitates their neighbours" underspecifies their procedure. Do they
imitate all the time, or only sometimes? Do they rely on the number of neighbours taking each
course of action, or imitate the most successful? Whether influenced by quantity or quality (or
both), do they select only among the highest-scoring alternatives, or use something like
proportional weighting? We show that different approaches can have very different results,
and their relative success can depend on the spatio-temporal heterogeneity of the
environment, and on what other decision-makers are doing.
The spread of agricultural innovations is of both scientific and practical interest. Most
research examines why apparently beneficial innovations are not adopted (Fujisaka 1994;
Cramb et al 1999), or the personal or social factors determining adoption (Feder and Slade1.3 1.3
2.1 2.1
1984), including the "risk aversion" of individuals (Abadi Ghadim and Pannell 1999), and
neighbours' influence (Ryan and Gross 1943; Pomp and Burger 1995; Abadi Ghadim and
Pannell 1999). The approach taken to modelling risk aversion here derives from the idea of an
aspiration level (Simon 1955): the lowest price a seller will accept. Simon (1957) suggested
that much human problem-solving relies on satisficing: seeking a good enough solution, then
looking no further, thus avoiding further search costs. Satisficing is represented in FEARLUS
by giving decision-makers an Aspiration Threshold [1] for the economic return on a Land
Parcel. If this is achieved, the Land Use on that Parcel will not be changed. Higher Aspiration
Thresholds represent lower risk aversion; or a different balance between strategies of
exploration (of the set of possible land uses) and exploitation (of the current land use). There
may be considerable risk in abandoning what worked well enough last year in pursuit of
possible higher returns. Also, there may be significant costs attached to change itself,
although FEARLUS does not currently represent such costs.
This paper summarises some previously published work using the FEARLUS modelling system
(Polhill Gotts and Law 2001; Gotts Polhill and Law 2003; Gotts Polhill and Adam 2003; Gotts
Polhill, Law and Izquierdo 2003), and reports new work extending and systematising these
studies. It discusses FEARLUS work in the context of literature on the role of imitation in land
use change and the adoption of agricultural innovations, and work on imitation in spatial
games. We show that a form of imitation in which land uses are selected on the criterion of
their recent performance within the neighbourhood of the land parcel concerned (called here
"Best-mean Imitation"), outperforms comparably simple forms of imitation in a wide range of
FEARLUS Environments. However, the choice of criterion interacts with both the way the
criterion is applied (whether selection is confined to the highest-scoring alternatives, or uses
proportional weighting based on the scores) and land managers' aspiration thresholds. Much
work on imitation in a spatial context has adopted particular forms of imitation without
considering the range of alternatives. The implications of work using FEARLUS for the broader
bodies of research discussed, and vice versa, are considered.
 Method  Method
General Description of FEARLUS Models General Description of FEARLUS Models
A FEARLUS model[2] consists of a set of Land Managers and their Environment, which includes
a grid of Land Parcels, and a set of possible Land Uses. Every Year, Land Managers select a
Land Use for each Land Parcel they own. Model parameters also specify External Conditions,
representing economic and climatic factors, and encoded as a bitstring, the length of which is
a model parameter. This bitstring can vary Year to Year but applies across the whole grid. In
most runs discussed, the initial bitstring is determined randomly, and each subsequent
bitstring is produced from its predecessor by applying a predetermined Flip Probability ( f) to
each bit independently: if f = 0 the initial bitstring will be retained throughout; if f = 1/2,
each Year's bitstring is independent of its predecessors and the External conditions are
temporally uncorrelated. If 0 < f < 1/2, the External Conditions change, but are temporally
correlated. Each Land Parcel also has a bitstring of Biophysical Characteristics, fixed for the
duration of a simulation run (again, bitstring length is a model parameter; it is the same for
all Land Parcels). There are also two numerical parameters unvarying over space and time (and2.2 2.2
2.3 2.3
2.4 2.4
over Land Managers): a Break Even Threshold, specifying how much Yield must be gained
from a Land Parcel to break even, and the Land Parcel Price. These fixed parameters are
unrealistic, but reduce the parameter space to be explored; they are key parts of the
mechanism allowing the transfer of Land Parcels from less successful to more successful Land
Managers.
In Year 0, Land Parcels are assigned to Land Managers, and there is a random allocation of
Land Uses to Land Parcels. Land Managers have an Account, initially set to zero. The rest of
the run repeats the following annual cycle:
1.  Selection of Land Uses. The Land Use for each Land Parcel is selected by its Land
Manager, using the latter's Land Use Selection Algorithm.
2.  Determination of External Conditions.
3.  Calculation of Yields. The concatenated bitstrings for a Parcel's Biophysical
Characteristics and the current External Conditions are matched against one
representing the requirements of the current Land Use: the Yield is the number of
matching bits.
4.  Harvest. The Account of each Land Manager is adjusted. For each Land Parcel owned,
that Parcel's Yield is added, and the Break Even Threshold subtracted.
5.  Selection of Land Parcels for sale, and retirement of insolvent Land Managers. Each Land
Manager in deficit sells Land Parcels as necessary to clear the deficit. Any unable to do
this while retaining at least one Parcel, leave the simulation.
6.  Land Sales. One ticket in a lottery is issued for each Grid Neighbour of the Parcel
belonging to a Land Manager with at least the Land Parcel Price in their Account (a Land
Parcel's Grid Neighbours are the eight Parcels orthogonally or diagonally adjacent to it).
One ticket is assigned to a potential new Land Manager. A Land Manager must buy the
Land Parcel if selected.
In addition to its Grid Neighbourhood, each Land Parcel has a Social Neighbourhood. This
includes all the Land Parcels managed by its own Land Manager, or by any Neighbour of that
Land Manager, where two Land Managers are Neighbours if and only if they manage Land
Parcels that are Grid Neighbours. Figure 1 illustrates the Grid and Social Neighbourhoods of
the central, stippled Parcel: the solid black line bounds the Social Neighbourhood, the dashed
line bounds the Grid Neighbourhood (except where overlain by the Social Neighbourhood
boundary). For a fuller description of FEARLUS models, see Polhill, Gotts and Law (2001).
Aspiration Threshold Selection Algorithms Aspiration Threshold Selection Algorithms
Most of the Selection Algorithms discussed here use an Aspiration Threshold: the Land
Manager checks whether the most recent Yield from a Land Parcel met the Threshold and if
so, leaves its Land Use unchanged. Otherwise, a Land Use is selected anew (either the same or
a different Land Use may be chosen). In the Selection Algorithms focussed on here, this
selection process involves either Random Experimentation (a random choice between the
possible Land Uses, all having equal likelihood of being selected), symbolised R in what
follows, or Imitation, in which the Land Use is selected from among those used in the Parcel's
Social Neighbourhood in the preceding Year. Note that the Aspiration Threshold has a
completely different role from the Break Even Threshold. The latter is a property of the2.5 2.5
2.6 2.6
2.7 2.7
Environment, specifying how hard it is for any Land Manager to break even on any Land
Parcel: it is the same for all Land Managers in a given run. The Aspiration Threshold is a
property of the individual Land Manager, specifying their risk aversion, or propensity to
experiment.
Figure 1 Figure 1. Grid and Social Neighbourhoods
Several different forms of Imitation are discussed. In Simple Imitation or SI, a weighted
random choice is made between all Land Uses employed within the Social Neighbourhood of
the Parcel in the preceding Year. The weights used are the number of Parcels in the Social
Neighbourhood assigned to each Land Use in the most recent Year, i.e. the Land Use's
popularity. Yield-based Imitation (YI) takes into account both the popularity of a particular
Land Use in the most recent Year, and how successful it was, weighting the probability of
choosing each Land Use by the total Yield for that Land Use across the Social Neighbourhood
i.e. the sum of the Yields on all the Land Parcels on which that Land Use was employed. In
Best-mean-weighted Imitation (BI), the random choice is weighted by the mean Yield of each
Land Use on Parcels in the Social Neighbourhood (so only success, not popularity, counts).
These forms of imitation all calculate scores for Land Uses, then make a probabilistic choice
between them using those scores as weights. An alternative is to choose only among those
which score highest - so if one Land Use scores higher than any other, it will be chosen
automatically, while if two or more have equal highest scores, each will have an equal
probability of being chosen. We call the three corresponding imitation strategies Selective
Simple Imitation (SSI), Selective Yield-based Imitation (SYI), and Selective Best-mean Imitation
(SBI). We thus have six forms of Imitation to consider, in addition to Random Experimentation.
Figure 2 and the accompanying table 1 give an example of Land Use selection by each of the
six forms of Imitation.
In figure 2, Last Year's Land Uses and Yields for each Land Parcel are represented by letters
and numbers respectively. Only those Land Parcels within the Social Neighbourhood of the
central, stippled Parcel would be considered in deciding which Land Use to imitate (Land Uses
and Yields of these Parcels are noted in white). Table 1 gives the number of Parcels, total Yield2.8 2.8
and mean Yield for each Land Use over those 28 Parcels. Land Use C is absent from the Social
Neighbourhood, and so would not be considered. The row maxima (in bold italics) indicate
which Land Use would be imitated when using each of the selective Algorithms (SSI: A, SYI: A
or D with 0.5 probability each, SBI: E). To calculate the probability of imitating each Land Use
with the proportional weighting Algorithms (SI, SYI, SBI), divide the number in the relevant cell
by the number in the "Sum" column.
Figure 2 Figure 2. Calculation of Land Use to Imitate
Table 1:  Table 1: Calculation of Land Use to Imitate
Land Use A B C D E Sum
Number of Parcels
(used in SI/SSI)
12 12 20 1 04 2 8
Total Yield
(used in YI/SYI)
93 93 16 0 93 93 42 244
Mean Yield
(used in BI/SBI)
7.75 8 N/A 9.3 10.25 10.25 35.3
Polhill, Gotts and Law (2001) and Gotts, Polhill and Adam (2003) found that a small admixture
of Random Experimentation sometimes makes a big difference to simulations involving
Algorithms otherwise depending wholly on Habit and Imitation. It can be either a small
disadvantage or a small advantage to the Land Managers employing it, but if all Land
Managers in a simulation rely wholly on Habit or Imitation, the number of Land Uses available
declines, eventually leaving Land Managers no choice. Performance differences between
Algorithms are then greatly diminished. Since our interest here is in the effects of different
Aspiration Thresholds, and forms of Imitation, all the Selection Algorithms used employ




Random Experimentation if their Aspiration Threshold is not met. All other Subpopulations
use it with a 1/16 probability when the Threshold is not met, but with 15/16 probability use
one of the six forms of Imitation. Thus in addition to HR we have HRBI ("Habit-Random-Best-
mean-Imitation), HRSBI, HRSI, HRSSI, HRYI and HRSYI Algorithms.
Simulation Environments Simulation Environments
In all FEARLUS models used here, the Land Parcels form a 7 by 7 or 21 by 21 toroidal grid,
which permits experiments involving relatively large numbers of runs, and avoids edge
effects. The bitstrings defining Land Uses' preferred conditions always contain 16 bits.
Environments differ in the division of these bits between Biophysical Characteristics (variable
across space, but fixed over time) and External Conditions (uniform across space but usually
variable over time). In new experiments reported here, the Break Even Threshold is always 8
(Gotts, Polhill and Law 2003, found that Environments with a Break Even Threshold lower or
higher than half the maximum Yield reduce performance differences between Selection
Algorithms), and the Land Parcel Price always 16.
The effect of using Land Parcel Biophysical Characteristics bits is that for any given Land
Parcel, some Land Uses will generally have an advantage over others. The Biophysical
Characteristics of Land Parcels may be either clumped or unclumped. In either case, each bit
is initially set to 0 or 1 with equal probability and independently, for every Land Parcel. In the
"clumping" process, carried out on each bit-position in turn during initialisation, adjacent
Land Parcels are selected at random to swap non-matching bit-values, for as long as there is
a swap which increases the number of neighbouring Land Parcels pairs that have the same
value. In the Environments used here, either all Biophysical bits are clumped or all are
unclumped; completely unclumped Environments are unrealistic, but variations in clumpiness
certainly exist, and the inclusion of the unclumped Environments allows the effect of such
variation to be investigated.
External Conditions may be fixed or variable, and if variable, either correlated or uncorrelated
from Year to Year (in the former case, the Flip Probability used here is 1/8; in the latter, it
must be 1/2). As we consider models with more Land Parcels, run for longer, FEARLUS models
in which all External Conditions are variable approach a limit where all Land Uses give equal
Yields, averaged over space and time. Allowing Fixed External Conditions means this is no
longer so: each Fixed External Condition bit gives an advantage to those Land Uses which
match it over those which do not, which operates on all Parcels and in all Years. Such bits
represent factors which can be assumed constant over time and over a large region.
All Environments used except one can be described using the following syntax: S<m>{c,u}-
T<n>{c,u}, where <m > and <n > stand for non-negative integers, "{" and "}" around a set of
comma-delineated elements indicates that either one of this set, or nothing, can be expected,
and "S" and "T" stand for "spatial" and "temporal" respectively. Thus "S12u-Tc4" indicates 12
unclumped Land Parcel Characteristic bits and 4 correlated External Conditions bits. These
characteristics of an Environment are referred to as its Type. Zero-length bitstrings indicate
no spatial — or no temporal — variation, so S0-T16c means no spatial variation and 16 bits
of correlated temporal variation. Most of the experiments described here use one of the






Thus we use two spatially homogeneous but time-varying Environment types (with the
variability either correlated or uncorrelated), two unvarying but spatially heterogeneous types
(with the spatial variation clumped or unclumped), and four which vary over both space and
time.
In S0-T16c Environments, Imitation should be very useful: without spatial variation, each Land
Parcel will give the same Yield; and since temporal variation is correlated, what worked well
last Year is likely to work well this Year. In S0-T16u Environments, by contrast, Random
Experimentation should do at least as well as any form of Imitation, because all Land Uses will
have the same expected Yield in every Year on every Parcel. In fact it does better than many
others (Gotts, Polhill, Law and Izquierdo 2003): diversity gives some security against large
losses once a Land Manager controls multiple Parcels.
In S16c-T0 and S16u-T0 Environments, there is no change from Year to Year, so a Land Use
that returns at least the Manager's Threshold on a Land Parcel, will never be changed. Hence
success should depend on the speed with which a Selection Algorithm finds such a Land Use,
but also on just how rewarding the Land Use found is likely to be - as particularly profitable
ones can compensate for losses elsewhere, and allow the Land Manager to expand their
holding when the opportunity arises. Some kinds of Imitation at least should allow their users
to take advantage of others' experience more effectively than Random Experimentation, but
Imitators will only be able to exploit this advantage for a short time, so its benefits are likely
to be less than in S0-T16c, where they can track change over time. Imitation should have
more benefit in S16c-T0 than in S16u-T0, as nearby Parcels will on average be more similar.
Of the other four Environment types we focus on (S8c-T8c, S8c-T8u, S8u-T8c and S8u-T8u),
S8c-T8c should be intermediate between S0-T16c and S16c-T0. The other three could be
expected to be less favourable to Imitation than S8c-T8c, with S8u-T8u being least
favourable.
Simulation Experiments Simulation Experiments
Most of the FEARLUS experiments discussed here consist of multiple simulation runs, pitting
two Subpopulations using different Selection Algorithms against each other in Contests to
assess their success in specific types of Environment. Land Managers are equally likely to
belong to either Subpopulation. At the start of each run, each Land Parcel is assigned to a
different Land Manager. At the end (after 200 Years), Subpopulation success is assessed by
counting the Parcels assigned to members of each. The runs in an experiment differ from only
because a new seed is generated for each run. The binomial test is used to determine whether
either Selection Algorithm has finished significantly more runs holding a majority of the Land
Parcels than the other. For many of the Contest experiments reported, we made predictions of
the results (based on the results of exploratory experiments, and our hypotheses about the
mechanisms producing them). We report these predictions along with the results. The latter
are taken to be significant when they reach the .01 level (1 tailed).
The remaining experiments use a single Subpopulation whose members vary in their
Aspiration Threshold, the result of primary interest being the mean Aspiration Threshold at
the end of the run.3.1 3.1
3.2 3.2
3.3 3.3
 Effects of Aspiration Thresholds  Effects of Aspiration Thresholds
Experiments on HR Selection Algorithms (reported in Gotts, Polhill and Law 2003), indicated
that the Aspiration Threshold makes a considerable difference to the performance of
Subpopulations using these Algorithms, across a wide range of Environments with Land Use
bitstrings of length 16, no fixed bits, and a Land Parcel Price of twice the Break Even
Threshold (which varied between 4 and 12). The overall picture was complex, but the effects
can be summarised as follows:
The optimal Aspiration Threshold appeared never to exceed whichever is the greater of
the Break Even Threshold, and 8 - the Yield that would be expected from a random
choice of Land Use, henceforth Random Choice Expected Yield, (half the maximum
Yield). Random Selection in these Environments has an expected Yield of 8, so if the
current Yield is above 8, Random Selection can be expected to reduce it.
However, if the Break Even Threshold was above 8, and inter-Year predictability was
high, the optimal Aspiration Threshold did sometimes exceed 8. In such Environments,
it may be worth experimenting, despite immediate expected losses, to find the Land
Use best suited to a Land Parcel.
In Environments with a Break Even Threshold of 8 and a lot of uncorrelated temporal
variation in External Conditions, an Aspiration Threshold somewhat below 8 appeared
optimal. Here, even a Land Use well suited to the Land Parcel will sometimes produce a
loss; only a large loss is a good indication that an alternative should be tried.
Gotts, Polhill and Adam (2003) also reported experiments with HRSBI Land Managers, which
indicated that in Environments with high inter-Year predictability and a Break Even Threshold
equal to the Random Choice Expected Yield, the optimal Aspiration Threshold could exceed
the Break Even Threshold. In a spatially heterogeneous FEARLUS Environment, Selective Best-
mean Imitation could be risky, but in a spatially homogeneous one, switching to the Land Use
with the highest mean Yield cannot give a lower expected Yield than sticking with the current
one, unless Year y 's Yields are negatively correlated with those of Year y + 1. This implies
that HRSBI could allow high Aspiration Thresholds to give good results in Environments with
little or no spatial heterogeneity. Experiments setting H8RSBI (HRSBI with Aspiration Threshold
8) against H10RSBI in the eight Environment types defined above, and in both 7 by 7 and 21
by 21 Environments, showed that H10RSBI outperformed H8RSBI only in S0-T16c (in both 7
by 7 and 21 by 21), and in S8c-T8c (21 by 21 only). This result was reversed in S8c-T8u,
S8u-T8u, S16c-T0 and S16u-T0 (in both 7 by 7 and 21 by 21 Environments). HRSBI stood out
as a clear exception among the seven families of Selection Algorithms: in none of the other six
did an Aspiration Threshold of 10 outperform one of 8 in any Environment type.
Contests between distinct Subpopulations are only one approach to investigating the effects
of Aspiration Threshold (or anything else) on competitive performance. We have used one
alternative to check the robustness of our findings on Aspiration Thresholds. In this approach,
all Land Managers in the simulation run have the same Land Use Selection Algorithm, except
for variation in the Aspiration Threshold. Whenever a Land Manager is created, its Aspiration
Threshold is drawn from a prespecified distribution. Given repeated runs in a given
Environment, an estimate of the mean Aspiration Threshold after a given period of time can
be calculated, along with confidence intervals for this estimate. Since good performance by3.4 3.4
higher Aspiration Threshold Land Managers will push this value up, and success for lower
Aspiration Threshold Managers will pull it down, the outcome provides a way of estimating
optimal Aspiration Thresholds. Table 2 shows the results for the seven families of Algorithm
(columns) and eight types of Environment (rows) tested. The prespecified statistical
distribution from which Aspiration Thresholds are drawn was a uniform distribution with
limits 3.5 and 12.5; hence a mean of 8.
Overall, the results are consistent with those of paired-Subpopulation experiments on
Aspiration Thresholds, but bring out some points those experiments did not. In table 4 the
figures in the cells are italicized if the 95% confidence interval for the value of the mean
Aspiration Threshold lies wholly below 8, and bolded  bolded if it lies wholly above 8. It will be seen
that in two Environment types (S8u-T8u and S16u-T0) the 95% confidence interval falls
wholly below 8 for all Algorithms, although not by much. This suggests that in these
Environments, it is advantageous to stay with a Land Use that just breaks even. The same is
true in most Environment types for two families of Land Use Selection Algorithm: HR and
HRSSI. Again, the deviation from the break-even value of 8 is small. For four families of
Algorithm (HRYI, HRSYI, HRBI, HRSBI) the 95% confidence interval lies wholly above 8 in at least
half the Environment types. Thus the results confirm that both Environment type and
Algorithm family affect the relative advantages of different Aspiration Thresholds; but in most
cases not by very much. HRBI and HRSBI are confirmed as unusual in favouring Aspiration
Thresholds well above 8 (and in one Environment type, S0-T16c, above 9); although HRYI and
HRSYI also favour Aspiration Thresholds above 8 (a result not found before), this was to a
markedly lesser degree.
Table 2:  Table 2: Estimate and 95% confidence intervals [in brackets] for mean of
Aspiration Thresholds across Land Parcels in FEARLUS 21 by 21
Environments. 60 runs of 200 simulation Years for each combination of
Algorithm class (columns) and Environment type (rows)







































































































[0.029] [0.034] [0.033] [0.035] [0.036] [0.031] [0.032]
In conclusion, using a fixed Aspiration Threshold of 8 across Environment types and Selection
Algorithm families is unlikely to distort comparisons between the latter.
 When Imitating, Best-mean Imitation is Best  When Imitating, Best-mean Imitation is Best
Moving on from the investigation of how Aspiration Thresholds affect performance across
both Environment types and Selection Algorithm families, we turn to investigating competition
between members of the different families. We focus again on the eight Environment types
discussed above, making brief mention of others chosen to check the generality of the
findings from them. We found clear differences between Environments: the result of Contests
between a given pair of Algorithms can frequently be reversed by changing the pattern of
spatio-temporal heterogeneity in the Environment; and in two cases by changing the
Environment's size.
In all eight Environment types, we ran Contests between each pair from the Selection
Algorithms H8R, H8RSI, H8RYI, H8RBI, H8RSSI, H8RSYI and H8RSBI. In the Environment type
S0-T16c only, we ran Contests between each pair from these seven plus H10R, H10RSI,
H10RYI, H10RBI, H10RSSI, H10RSYI and H10RSBI; this was done because the results reported
above show that in this Environment type, H10RSBI does better than H8RSBI, and the mean
Aspiration Threshold for HRSBI and a number of other Algorithm families rises well above 8 in
the experiments with results shown in Table 2. The Contests involving Algorithms with
Aspiration Threshold 10 are dealt with later in this section.
Tables 3-6 show the results of Contests between the seven Algorithms with Aspiration
Threshold 8. Each table shows results for two of the eight Environment Types, and for
Environments of two different sizes: 7 by 7 (120 runs per Contest), and 21 by 21 (60 runs per
Contest). The figure on the left in each cell concerns the 7 by 7 Contest between a pair of
Selection Algorithms in a specific type of Environment, the figure in parentheses on the right
of the cell, the 21 by 21 Contest. In the upper-right half of each table, these figures give the
number of runs ending with an advantage to the column Algorithm; in the lower-left half, the
figures indicate the number of runs ending with an advantage to the row Algorithm. Figures in
red indicate an advantage to the column Algorithm significant at the .01 level (two-tailed) in
the upper-right half, to the row Algorithm at the same significance level in the lower-left half;
those in blue, such an advantage for the other Algorithm. For example, the blue "18 (1)"
toward the top left of Table 3 means that HRBI won only 18 out of 120 runs against HRSBI in
the 7 by 7 Contest in S0-T16c, and only 1 out of 60 in the 21 by 21, and that these margins
were significant at the .01 level (two-tailed). In S0-T16u, however, the corresponding figures
for H8RBI were 57 and 40, neither significant at the chosen level. These arrangements thus
facilitate comparison of results in Environments of different sizes, and of results in the types
of Environment in the two halves of the table. Figure 3 shows the results involving H8RSBI in
graphical form. The coloured bars show the number of runs won by H8RSBI in the 7 by 7
Environments (read off the bottom scale of each subfigure). Where the proportion of wins in
the corresponding 21 by 21 Environment for the same pairing of Selection Algorithms is
different, this is shown by an additional line across the coloured bar, or an uncoloured4.4 4.4
extension of the bar (number of wins for H8RSBI being read off the top scale).
The most obvious outcome of these experiments is the success of the H8RSBI Selection
Algorithm: across all Environment types except S0-T16u, and across both 7 by 7 and 21 by
21 Environments, it outperforms the four Algorithms that use Simple or Yield-based Imitation
(H8RSI, H8RSSI, H8RYI and H8RSYI). It also outperforms both H8RBI and H8R in S0-T16c, S8c-
T8c, S8u-T8c, S8c-T8u and S16c-T0. It is never outperformed by H8RBI; and is
outperformed by H8R only in S0-T16u - the Environment type where maximizing Land Use
diversity should be most advantageous.
Table 3:  Table 3: Outcomes of some Selection Algorithm Contests in spatially
homogeneous, temporally variable Environments (upper-right in both :
S0-T16c; lower-left: S0-T16u)
H8RSBI H8RBI H8RSYI H8RYI H8RSSI H8RSI H8R
H8RSBI — 18 (1) 16 (1) 8 (0) 7 (0) 6 (1) 8 (1)
H8RBI 57 (40) — 41 (14) 56 (21) 12 (1) 32 (8) 35 (3)
H8RSYI 65 (25) 50 (27) — 90 (54) 25 (2) 71 (36) 54 (25)
H8RYI 62 (23) 59 (29) 59 (37) — 9 (0) 32 (6) 39 (8)
H8RSSI 49 (23) 45 (33) 52 (29) 58 (32) — 107 (58) 94 (57)
H8RSI 59 (30) 62 (28) 65 (32) 58 (29) 70 (27) — 63 (22)
H8R 70 (42) 74 (33) 77 (31) 70 (39) 82 (38) 67 (39) —
Table 4:  Table 4: Outcomes of some Selection Algorithm Contests in spatially
variable, temporally unchanging Environments (upper-right: S16c-T0,
lower-left: S16u-T0)
H8RSBI H8RBI H8RSYI H8RYI H8RSSI H8RSI H8R
H8RSBI — 29 (2) 34 (1) 36 (0) 19 (0) 40 (1) 29 (1)
H8RBI 54 (24) — 59 (23) 49 (27) 30 (4) 56 (15) 49 (20)
H8RSYI 30 (2) 46 (7) — 69 (38) 42 (8) 61 (18) 61 (28)
H8RYI 44 (22) 54 (23) 79 (53) — 29 (5) 65 (26) 56 (22)
H8RSSI 34 (1) 34 (2) 55 (22) 35 (3) — 80 (49) 83 (47)
H8RSI 58 (17) 61 (15) 81 (53) 56 (25) 85 (58) — 64 (29)
H8R 57 (29) 75 (33) 80 (56) 66 (44) 90 (60) 68 (46) —
Table 5:  Table 5: Outcomes of some Selection Algorithm Contests in spatially
variable, temporally variable but auto-correlated Environments (upper-
right: S8c-T8c, lower-left: S8u-T8c)
H8RSBI H8RBI H8RSYI H8RYI H8RSSI H8RSI H8RH8RSBI — 14 (0) 12 (0) 21 (0) 5 (0) 18 (0) 11 (0)
H8RBI 35 (0) — 41 (20) 57 (25) 13 (0) 48 (15) 40 (6)
H8RSYI 7 (0) 17 (0) — 83 (49) 37 (2) 83 (38) 79 (16)
H8RYI 23 (1) 37 (14) 101 (60) — 11 (0) 42 (17) 47 (6)
H8RSSI 5 (0) 7 (0) 43 (12) 10 (0) — 102 (59) 87 (48)
H8RSI 20 (1) 44 (10) 97 (59) 45 (18) 101 (60) —5 9   (12)
H8R 22 (0) 65 (28) 104 (60) 56 (43) 114 (60) 79 (48) —
Table 6:  Table 6: Outcomes of some Selection Algorithm Contests in spatially
variable, temporally variable and uncorrelated Environments (upper-right:
S8c-T8u, lower-left: S8u-T8u
H8RSBI H8RBI H8RSYI H8RYI H8RSSI H8RSI H8R
H8RSBI — 32 (3) 24 (3) 28 (5) 18 (0) 26 (3) 19 (0)
H8RBI 61 (29) — 45 (29) 62 (35) 22 (6) 56 (25) 43 (2)
H8RSYI 21 (0) 15 (0) — 88 (42) 39 (4) 75 (30) 67 (1)
H8RYI 37 (12) 49 (13) 99 (59) — 15 (3) 39 (15) 42 (1)
H8RSSI 21 (0) 17 (0) 63 (20) 25 (0) — 88 (60) 81 (11)
H8RSI 38 (12) 45 (13) 98 (60) 60 (26) 100 (59) —4 8   (4)
H8R 54 (33) 65 (42) 102 (60) 60 (45) 103 (60) 74 (48) —4.5 4.5
4.6 4.6
Figure 3 Figure 3. Outcomes of Contests from Table 3 involving H8RSBI
In S0-T16c Environments, a Land Use's mean Yield in the Neighbourhood is a better guide
than total Yield across the Neighbourhood, and this in turn is better than the number of
Parcels where it is used. Choosing only among the highest scorers works well only if the mean
Yield is used; otherwise, weighting proportional to the scores does better. Clearly, with a good
enough scoring system, choosing only from the very best scorers should work well; but why is
it a disadvantage with one that is less good, but still better than random, as appears to be the
case when we compare HRYI with HRSYI? The likely answer is the advantage that Land Uses
diversity has both for individual Land Managers and for Subpopulations (Gotts, Polhill, Law
and Izquierdo 2003).
In S0-T16u Environments, by contrast (where Year to Year change is wholly unpredictable),





"Selective" Algorithms: H8RSBI, H8RSYI and H8RSSI - which are those that should produce
least diversity (and no other significant results).
With the exception of S0-T16u, the order of the Imitation Algorithms is pretty consistent:
H8RSBI at the top, then H8RBI and H8RYI, then H8RSI and H8RSYI, finally H8RSSI. The very
poor performance of H8RSSI is presumably due to Land Managers using it getting trapped in a
single Land Use, even when conditions change: it would be very difficult for a Population
consisting entirely of HRSSI Managers to escape from a near-monoculture once formed,
despite the component of Random Experimentation. In all Environment types except S0-T16u,
H8RSI outperformed H8RSSI; and in all except S0-T16u and S16c-T0 H8RYI outperformed
H8RSYI, confirming that if the scoring criterion used in deciding what to imitate is not
particularly good, a weighted choice is better than selecting from the highest scorers only.
Furthermore, H8R outperformed H8RSSI in all the four Environments, and H8RSYI in all but the
S8c-T8u case, confirming that Imitation can give worse outcomes than Random
Experimentation.
The position of HR relative to this hierarchy, however, changes substantially, although it is
always above H8RSSI. It is highest in S0-T16u (as expected), then S8u-T8u and S16u-T0,
S8c-T8u, S16c-T0, S8u-T8c, S8c-T8c and S0-T16c. Note that among the four Environment
Types with both spatial and temporal variation, the spatially clumped Environments (S8c-T8c
and S8c-T8u), in which nearby Parcel pairs are likely to resemble each other more than
distant ones, were more favourable to Imitative Selection Algorithms than the other two.
Temporal correlation also appears to improve the relative performance of Imitation relative to
Random Experimentation, but to a lesser extent.
Reversals of competitive advantage between the types of Environment differing only in the
correlated or uncorrelated nature of either spatial or temporal variation (i.e., between the
pairs of Environment types in each of tables 3-6) occur, with one exception, only in Contests
between H8R and others, adding to the evidence that the competitive relationships between
forms of Imitation are considerably more robust under changes of Environment than those
between Imitation and Random Experimentation.
The only reversals of competitive advantage between large and small Environments of the
same type occur in the S8c-T8c H8R/H8RSYI Contest and the S8c-T8u H8R/H8RSSI Contest,
where the Imitative Algorithm outperforms H8R in large Environments, but is outperformed in
small ones. (More generally and with few exceptions, small-Environment Contests are less
one-sided than the corresponding large-Environment ones.) These reversals hint that
Imitation works better in the larger Environments, at least where there is clustered spatial
variation, perhaps because in these Environments, there are likely to be at least some sizeable
patches where there is little spatial variation.
The Contests recorded in the upper-right of table 3 are a subset of those undertaken in S0-
T16c Environments. The results of corresponding Contests among Selection Algorithms with
Aspiration Threshold 10 are shown in table 7. There are few large differences from table 3;
most noticeable is that H10R does less well than did H8R, while H10RBI fails to outperform
H10RSYI as H8RBI did H8RSYI. In the 7 by 7 Environments, each of the 14 Algorithms was in
fact matched against each of the others and a fairly clear pattern emerged: the most
important difference was between Families of Algorithms, not Aspiration Thresholds: HRSBI4.12 4.12
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performed best; then HRBI and HRYI; then HRSI, HRSYI and HR; and finally HRSSI. At the top of
the order of Families, Aspiration Threshold 10 was better than Threshold 8, in the middle
there was little to choose between these Aspiration Thresholds, and at the bottom Threshold
10 performed worse. It makes sense that the better the procedure used when the Aspiration
Threshold is not met, the higher the optimal Threshold tends to be, as that procedure will be
used more when the Threshold is higher.
Table 7:  Table 7: Outcome of some Selection Algorithm Contests between
Algorithms with Aspiration Threshold 10, in spatially homogeneous,
temporally variable but correlated Environments
H10RSBI H10RBI H10RSYI H10RYI H10RSSI H10RSI H10R
H10RSBI — 12 (1) 19 (3) 17 (1) 7 (0) 8 (1) 0 (0)
H10RBI — 58 (30) 71 (29) 14 (7) 39 (8) 9 (0)
H10RSYI — 86 (46) 35 (6) 68 31 31 (9)
H10RYI — 9 (2) 26 (3) 13 (1)
H10RSSI — 112 (59) 92 (50)
H10RSI — 31 (10)
H10R —
So far, we have not seen any Environments in which HRSBI is definitely inferior to any of the
other Imitative Selection algorithms investigated. However, there are indeed such
Environments, specifically those which are highly unpredictable Year to Year, but still give the
Land Manager something useful to learn about what Land Uses to employ where (S0-T16u
Environments are maximally unpredictable among Environments with 16 bits of spatio-
temporal variation, but all Land Uses have the same expected Yield on all Land Parcels).
Specifically, we looked at S1u-T15u Environments (one bit of unclumped spatial variation, 15
of uncorrelated temporal variation). The advantage for an Aspiration Threshold below the
Break Even Threshold (specifically, one of 6 compared to a Break Even Threshold of 8), found
for the HR, HYI and HRYI Families of Algorithms by Gotts, Polhill, Law and Izquierdo (2003),
also applied to the HRBI and HRSBI Families. We also confirmed that in S1u-T15u
Environments, the Aspiration Threshold used had more influence than the procedure adopted
if that Threshold was not reached.
We therefore looked at Contests between Subpopulations using pairs of Algorithms with
Aspiration Threshold 6, running Contests between all pairs of such Algorithms in 7 by 7
Environments. The main points to note are:
HR did well: in fact, H6R easily outperformed all the other Algorithms except H6RBI
(against which it had a non-significant advantage).
H6RBI clearly outperformed all the other imitative Algorithms.
H6RSBI clearly outperformed the remaining four Algorithms, so Best-mean Imitation
does better than Simple or Yield-based Imitation, as in all other Environment types tried




HRBI (and to a lesser extent HRSBI) may simply be less disadvantaged than other imitative
Families, because Best-mean Imitation, unlike Simple and Yield-based Imitation, does not
tend to copy the Land Uses which are currently most common on nearby Parcels, which is
likely to reduce diversity.
Finally, we looked at a type of spatially homogeneous Environment in which, unlike those
considered so far, some Land Uses gave higher expected Yields than others over time. The
S0-T8f8u Environment type has eight bits of temporally uncorrelated variation in External
Conditions, while another eight bits do not vary at all. The effect is that when Land Uses are
assigned bitstrings at random, some Land Uses are likely to match these fixed External
Conditions better than others. However, which Land Uses are objectively best will be partially
obscured by the "noise" of the eight bits of uncorrelated variation. HRSBI was, as often, the
most successful Family (and H10RSBI outperformed H8RSBI), but, in contrast to all the
standard Environment types, HRSYI (Habit/Random/Selective-Yield-based-Imitation)
outperformed HRYI (Habit/Random/Yield-based Imitation). In this type of Environment, then,
a criterion of total Yield appears good enough to make choosing from among the best only,
superior to choosing by proportional weighting - although still inferior to mean Yield. We
hypothesise that because some Land Uses generally have higher expected Yields than others
over the long term, the degree of "inertia" which Yield-based Imitation involves (tending to go
on doing what most of your Neighbours have done) is less harmful than in the eight standard
Environments. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the algorithms involving
Simple Imitation outcompeted H8R - although losing to the other Imitative Algorithms with
Aspiration Threshold 8 - showing that even the greater degree of inertia brought about by
Simple Imitation is better than Random Experimentation in this type of Environment.
 Discussion  Discussion
The main conclusion of the work reported is that Best-mean Imitation is superior to Simple or
Yield-based Imitation across a wide range of FEARLUS Environments; and that Selective Best-
mean Imitation (choosing from among the best only) is generally better than using
proportional weighting. This yields the prediction that when imitating neighbours, farmers will
do better to adopt the currently best-performing land use in their neighbourhood rather than
the most popular, or that producing the greatest total return across the neighbourhood - and,
given the simplicity of the procedure, that when imitating they will actually do this or
something similar.
Further possible lessons from the simulations reported can be summarised as follows:
1.  The optimum aspiration threshold appears to depend primarily on the predictability of
returns from alternative courses of action over time: the more unpredictable the world
is, the lower the threshold, so that in some cases it should be set below what is needed
to survive indefinitely.
2.  In highly unpredictable environments, experimentation is at least as good as any form of
imitation, when the aspiration threshold is not met.
3.  In all but the most unpredictable environments, however, some form of imitation should
outperform random experimentation; experiment only if no-one else is doing so. This
advice, and the results behind it, suggest the existence of a social dilemma - a situation5.3 5.3
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in which each of a group of interacting agents faces a choice between "selfish" and
"cooperative" actions (experimenting at least occasionally being the cooperative choice);
each will profit individually from the selfish choice (whatever others do); but all will be
better off if all act cooperatively. However, the dilemma here may not be particularly
sharp: only a little experimentation is required to avoid a decline into monoculture, so
successful land managers might well be able to bear the costs.
4.  Given a particular scoring criterion for alternative courses of action in any context,
whether selection should be made from among the highest-scoring options only, or on
some broader basis such as proportional weighting, depends on how good the criterion
is. With a good enough criterion, selection from among the highest-scoring options
only is superior to proportional weighting. This is particularly interesting because many
of the key results of evolutionary game theory (Taylor and Jonker 1978; Bendor and
Swistak 1997; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) depend on the assumption that any
strategy which scores above the population mean will increase in frequency, even if
there are superior strategies in the population. The assumption may be justified for
biological evolution, but when agents learn from each other it would not in general hold
if strategy-learning takes place by Selective Best-mean Imitation.
Work on imitation within FEARLUS in the context needs to be placed in the context of the
most relevant studies in three areas:
research on the adoption, or spread, of agricultural innovations,
imitation within agent-based models of rural land use, and more briefly,
work on imitation in spatial games.
Research on the adoption of agricultural innovations goes back to Ryan and Gross (1943).
Only recently, however, have panel studies (Besley and Case 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig
1995; Pomp and Burger 1995) and anthropological/ethnographic studies (Letenyei 2001;
Chiffoleau 2005) provided some detail concerning micro-level processes, confirming that
farmers are influenced toward adopting new land uses or techniques by the example of other
farmers they know.
There are few studies of the spatial characteristics of innovation diffusion, but most of the
exceptions indicate that imitation of neighbours is indeed important. Ryan and Gross (1943),
studying the diffusion of hybrid seed corn in Iowa, found that "Commercial channels,
especially salesmen, were most important as original sources of knowledge, while neighbours
were most important as influences leading to acceptance." Hägerstrand ( 1967) found that
innovation spread from a few focal points, although not necessarily from farm to contiguous
farm. Case (1992) found "strong neighbourhood effects" in the adoption of new farming
technologies in Indonesia. Foster and Rosensweig ( 1995) found that farmers adopting HYV
(high-yielding variety) wheat and rice benefited (in terms of productivity) from having
neighbours who had already done so - confirming that they were learning about techniques
from their neighbours rather than simply learning about new varieties' potential profitability.
Rich farmers tended to adopt earlier, and poor farmers with richer neighbours possibly
tended to delay their own adoption of new varieties, "free-riding" on the risk taken by those
neighbours. Thus there is indirect evidence that innovation has significant costs, but for
wealthier farmers, the potential longer-term gains may outweigh the risk of short-term





how willing they should be to experiment, this willingness should come to correlate with
wealth.
Schmidt and Rounsevell (2006) found that imitation leaves little noticeable trace on landscape
pattern in a case study in central Belgium. Specifically, neighbouring parcels cultivated by
farmers living in close proximity are "only slightly more similar" than neighbouring parcels
cultivated by farmers living further from each other. The authors call into question the study
of imitation in agent-based models of land use change. However, it is not clear how broadly
generalizable this result is, as they admit: one might expect to find the clearest evidence of
imitation of neighbours in situations of rapid change, whether involving completely novel
innovations or the tracking of exogenous changes in profitability - and to determine whether
rapid change is occurring, longitudinal studies are required. Moreover, if the choice of targets
for imitation in the real world approximates to the Social Neighbourhood in FEARLUS, there is
no reason to expect any effect of the distance between farmers' homes, once they share a
parcel boundary: specifically, in the work reported above, FEARLUS Land Managers take equal
account of all the Land Parcels owned by those with whom they share any parcel boundary
(even a single point). The rationale for this is that being able to see something of the results a
neighbour is getting on a regular basis will greatly increase the salience of that neighbour's
successes and failures; a better test of the FEARLUS approach would be to examine whether,
among pairs of land parcels at equal distances cultivated by different farmers, there is more
land use similarity between pairs where the farmers cultivating them share a parcel boundary.
Turning to agent-based models of land use change, a number have modelled imitation, but
FEARLUS appears to be the only one for which systematic performance comparisons between
agents making use of imitation to different extents, and of different kinds, has been
undertaken. Nonetheless, some comparisons may be useful.
Hägerstrand (1967) developed a series of simple simulation models (apparently without use of
a computer, but employing tables of random numbers) attempting to reproduce the
qualitative spatial features of innovation diffusion, described as follows (pp. 133-134):
Stage 1. Local concentrations of initial acceptances (initial agglomerations).
Stage 2. Radial dissemination outward from the initial agglomerations is accompanied
by the rise of secondary agglomerations, while those original centres simultaneously
continue to condense.
Stage 3. The growth ceases (saturation phase).
A model in which the population falls into a number of "resistance classes", defined by the
number of neighbours who must inform the individual they have adopted it before the
individual themselves adopts, reproduced the qualitative features of the three-stage process
above. This kind of adoption threshold is distinct from any of the selection criteria used with
FEARLUS, but closer to Simple Imitation than to the Yield-based or Best-mean varieties, in
that only the number of neighbours taking a particular course of action is considered.
Lansing and Kremer's model of a Balinese agricultural socio-ecosystem (Lansing and Kremer
1994; Lansing 2000) concerns the choice between a finite set of mutually exclusive
alternatives, in this case cropping patterns in rain-irrigated rice-growing. The model uses
something distinct from any of the approaches so far used with FEARLUS, although most5.11 5.11
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similar to Selective Best-mean Imitation: the agents (farmers' cooperatives called subaks)
copy the cropping pattern of their most successful neighbour; in FEARLUS Selective Best-
mean Imitation, a single very good result could be outweighed by a number of poor ones.
Also, a FEARLUS agent may have multiple choices to make (one per Land Parcel), and takes
account of what has happened on individual Land Parcels, rather than on the land managed
by each agent considered as a whole. Furthermore, the choices made by the subaks interact
directly in a way that has no parallel in the FEARLUS models discussed here. Starting subaks
with randomly assigned schedules, and allowing them to copy more successful neighbours,
gave rise to spatio-temporal patterns of cropping qualitatively similar to those observed. It
would be interesting to discover whether different forms of imitation, which could be
modelled on the alternatives examined for FEARLUS here, would preserve this result, and to
the extent each did so, whether it would alter the speed at which the system evolved (Janssen,
2007, shows that at least one way of changing both neighbourhood and imitation criterion
together does alter the outcome). Conversely, FEARLUS experiments could be conducted using
the "imitate the best" approach (at either Parcel or Manager level).
The "Consumat" approach to modelling decision-making (Janssen and Jager 1999; Jager et al
2000) has been applied in a spatially-explicit model of land use selection (Dung et al 2005).
Agents have four different ways of making decisions, depending on levels of "satisfaction"
(with the outcome of recent behaviour) and "uncertainty" (regarding the outcomes of
behaviour, assessed by comparing expected and actual recent outcomes). If "satisfied" and
"certain" they repeat previous behaviour; if "satisfied" and "uncertain" they imitate another
agent's recent behaviour; if "unsatisfied" and "certain" they "deliberate" (use "reasoned
individual processing" to assess expected outcomes); if "unsatisfied" and "uncertain" they use
"social comparison" - observing what another agent has done, then calculating expected
outcomes for that behaviour and their own previous behaviour, selecting whichever gives the
higher expectation. In the model of Dung et al (2005), imitation and social comparison are
based on the most popular choice among a set of agents (among three alternatives - rice
growing, shrimp farming, or a mixture of the two). In every run, each agent was randomly
assigned an individual satisfaction threshold and uncertainty threshold from the same
distribution: there was no exploration of the results of changing these thresholds (altering the
proportion of each behaviour), or of the relative performance of agents with different
thresholds within a single simulation, although the development of economic inequality was
one of the foci of the research.
There are some interesting points of comparison and contrast between this study and results
from FEARLUS. The FEARLUS agents discussed here have a satisfaction threshold, like
Consumat agents, but do not have an uncertainty threshold. When satisfaction (with regard to
a specific Land Parcel) is above this threshold, the agent always repeats its previous action, in
contrast to consumat agents, which will imitate the agent with which it has most recently
compared itself when uncertainty is high, and repeat only when it is low. The association of
social information processing with high uncertainty (whether satisfaction is high or low) is
justified by Janssen and Jager (1999) by reference to Festinger's social comparison theory
(Festinger 1954) which states (Janssen and Jager 1999, section 3.6) that:
"the drive to compare one's opinions and abilities with that of others is larger, the
more uncertain one is regarding one's own opinions and abilities."5.13 5.13
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However, FEARLUS results reported here indicate that as Year-to-Year uncertainty increases
(this is uncertainty inherent in the environment rather than measured by the individual agent
from the accuracy of their predictions, but increasing inherent environmental uncertainty
would make such predictions less accurate), repetition becomes increasingly favoured over
Imitation of any kind, and the latter also becomes less favoured relative to Random
Experimentation (probably because the rewards of Imitation fall, while those of diversity,
which Random Experimentation tends to increase, do not). The results reported in Polhill,
Gotts and Law (2001) also indicate that greater Year-to-Year uncertainty favours Selection
Algorithms based on the long-term expected mean performance on specific Land Parcels at
the expense of Imitative Selection Algorithms. In at least some kinds of decision-making,
then, people behaving as Festinger and the consumat approach predict would lose out to
those behaving differently. They may behave in such a manner, but when comparably simple
alternatives would do better, it does seem likely selective pressures would lead to their
adoption. How people actually change their tendency to imitative behaviour as environmental
uncertainty increases would seem to be discoverable by laboratory experiment, but we have
found no directly relevant studies.
There is extensive research on "spatial games", in which multiple players are embedded within
a grid and play simple games such as the "Prisoner's Dilemma" against their neighbours. Each
cell in the grid is initially assigned a strategy (drawn from some predefined strategy space),
then one or more rounds of "play" between neighbours alternate with a strategy-updating
process, interpreted either as reproduction, or as learning by imitation. Often (e.g. Nowak and
Sigmund 1993; Grim 1996; Killingback et al 1999; Eguíluz, Zimmermann and Cela-Conde
2005), this uses "imitate the best" - the highest-scoring neighbour is copied. Other studies of
imitation in simple spatial games use selective best-mean imitation (Eshel Samuelson and
Shaked 1998; Eshel et al 2000; Noailly, Withagen and van den Bergh 2005); comparison with a
random neighbour, with a probabilistic switch of strategy if the neighbour has done better
(Kirchkamp 2000) - functionally similar to Simple Imitation; or comparison with the scores of
each neighbour, with the strategy of a higher-neighbour being adopted with probability
proportional to the difference in scores (Brandt, Hauert and Sigmund 2003).
Only a few such studies examine whether using different forms of imitation produces different
outcomes. Cohen et al (1999) used three different imitation processes, along with a number
of different strategy spaces for the game used - the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma - and
different ways of defining a network of interaction, including a conventional two-dimensional
grid. The three imitation processes were imitation of the highest-scoring neighbour without
error (Imit), imitation (with errors) of the highest-scoring neighbour (BMGA), and imitation
(with errors) of a random neighbour, if it had done better than the imitating agent (1FGA).
These interacted with the strategy space and the form of network used in complex ways.
Janssen (2000), by contrast (using the simple Prisoner's Dilemma), found no qualitative
difference in results depending on whether imitate the best, or selective best-mean imitation
was used. Yoon (2005), replicated the study of Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998) on simple
agents arranged in a circle, acting either altruistically or egoistically toward their neighbours,
and then updating their choice of action by imitating successful neighbours - but substituted
imitate the best for selective best-mean imitation. This drastically altered the dynamics of the
situation, leading to a consistent fall in the frequency of cooperative behaviour in place of the
rise found in the original study.5.15 5.15
5.16 5.16
To summarise, much of the work reviewed here makes use of a particular form of imitation
without consideration of the alternatives, although the FEARLUS experiments described,
Janssen (2007) and some of the studies of simple spatial games mentioned show that
different approaches to the question of when and how to imitate neighbours can make a
profound difference. Conversely, non-FEARLUS work both suggests additional alternatives not
yet tried within FEARLUS (such as "imitate the best"); and to differences between the adoption
of truly novel land uses or land management practices on the one hand, and tracking
potentially reversible changes in relative returns from different land uses on the other.
FEARLUS has not yet been used to model the former, but there is no reason this should not be
done. More difficult would be to adapt FEARLUS to model the often complex interactions
between different innovations revealed in empirical work on innovation adoption, and the
ability to profit from neighbours' experience of the techniques required to make a potential
innovation successful suggested by work such as that of Foster and Rosensweig (1995).
Future FEARLUS work on imitation could reasonably drop these less successful forms of
Imitation, and concentrate on the trade-off between selecting the most profitable Land Uses
using Best-mean Imitation, and maintaining Land Use diversity. In the same way as the work
shown in table 2 drew the Aspiration Threshold for each Land Manager from a continuous
distribution, the probability a dissatisfied Land Manager uses Selective Best-mean Imitation
rather than Random Experimentation could be set in the same way. This probability, and the
Aspiration Threshold, could also be varied for individual Land Managers to allow trial-and-
error learning; but it is not feasible that a farmer could observe and imitate these features of
neighbours' decision processes, or inherit them. There remains plenty of mileage in extending
FEARLUS modelling studies of imitation, but at some stage, a change from the representation
of "Land Uses" as unitary packages, to more articulated representations of land management
options, will be required.
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 Notes  Notes
1 Terms for FEARLUS model constructs are given upper-case initial letters, and italicised on
first use.
2 The experiments newly reported here used FEARLUS versions 0-5-1-4, 0-5-1-5 (which
differ only slightly) and 0-6-8-2. Versions 0-5-1-5 and 0-6-8-2, and relevant parameter
files and scripts, are available from the authors.
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